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Abstract  
Recently, Gunn, Allison and Abbott (GAA) [http://arxiv.org/pdf/1402.2709v2.pdf] proposed a new scheme to
utilize electromagnetic waves for eavesdropping on the Kirchhoff-law–Johnson-noise (KLJN) secure key 
distribution. We proved in a former paper [Fluct. Noise Lett. 13 (2014) 1450016] that GAA’s mathematical 
model is unphysical. Here we analyze GAA’s cracking scheme and show that, in the case of a loss-free cable, it 
provides less eavesdropping information than in the earlier (Bergou)-Scheuer-Yariv mean-square-based attack 
[Kish LB, Scheuer J, Phys. Lett. A 374:2140–2142 (2010)], while it offers no information in the case of a lossy 
cable. We also investigate GAA’s claim to be experimentally capable of distinguishing—using statistics over a 
few correlation times only—the distributions of two Gaussian noises with a relative variance difference of less 
than 10–8. Normally such distinctions would require hundreds of millions of correlations times to be observable. 
We identify several potential experimental artifacts as results of poor KLJN design, which can lead to GAA’s 
assertions: deterministic currents due to spurious harmonic components caused by ground loops, DC offset, 
aliasing, non-Gaussian features including non-linearities and other non-idealities in generators, and the time-
derivative nature of GAA’s scheme which tends to enhance all of these artifacts. 
Keywords: KLJN key exchange; information theoretic security; unconditional security. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Recently Gunn, Allison and Abbott (GAA) [1] proposed a new scheme to utilize 
electromagnetic waves for eavesdropping on the Kirchhoff-law–Johnson-noise (KLJN) secure 
key distribution. In a former paper [2], we proved that claims concerning electromagnetic 
waves are unphysical in GAA’s attack, since the quasi-static limit holds for the KLJN scheme 
and implies that physical waves do not exist in its wire channel. An assumption of wave 
modes in a short cable, and in the low-frequency limit, in fact violates a number of laws of 
physics, including the Second Law of Thermodynamics. One aspect related to these mistakes 
is that, in electrical engineer jargon, all oscillating and propagating time functions are called 
waves, whereas in physics the corresponding retarded potentials can be wave-type or non-
wave-type. Physical waves involve two dual energy forms that regenerate each other during 
propagation; these forms can involve electrical and magnetic fields, or deal with kinetic and 
potential energy as in the case of elastic waves. Non-wave-type retarded potentials in the 
quasi-static regime, however, have negligible crosstalk between the two energy forms, and 
energy exchange takes place between them and generators [2]; this latter situation pertains to 
the KLJN scheme. We note in passing that, while there are no physical waves in the KLJN 
system, the propagation delay of the non-wave-type retarded potentials may still provide 
information for Eve, and therefore a correct analysis is essential. 
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In the steady-state driving case, the correct analysis [2] shows that the starting d’Alembert 
equation  
U(t, x) =U+ t − xv
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟ +U− t +
x
v
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟  ,        (1) 
which is the foundation of GAA’s approach, is invalid because the system under study cannot 
be described with a single phase velocity [2], but these velocities are directionally dependent 
during secure key exchange. Here U+ and U– are voltage components of waves propagating to 
the right and left along the x-axis, and v is a single propagation velocity. GAA used Eq. 1 to 
deduce the equations 
dU
dt + v
dU
dx = 2
dU+
dt             (2) 
and  
dU
dt − v
dU
dx = 2
dU−
dt           (3) 
as a basis of their “directional coupler” attack. Their claim [1] is that the quantities at the left-
hand side of Eqs. 2 and 3 are measurable so that the time derivatives at the right-hand side of 
the equations can be calculated and used for eavesdropping. 
Before analyzing the experimental claims and potential artifacts, we take a closer look at the 
mathematics of Eqs. 1–3. 
 
2. Mathematical analysis of GAA’s scheme 
In this section, we present a correct analysis of GAA’s scheme and show that Eve’s 
eavesdropped information is always less within the GAA scheme than within the old mean-
square attack based on the comparison of two end-voltages [3], unless there are flaws in the 
realization of the KLJN key exchanger.  
We assume in the rest of the paper that the bit-value arrangement between Alice and Bob is 
mixed, i.e., one of them connects the large resistance to the cable and the other uses the small 
resistance. This situation indicates not only a secure key exchange event but also that different 
phase velocities must be used for the two directions in Eq. 1 during steady-state conditions 
(see also related theory and verifications by simulation in our former paper [2]). 
 
2.1 General considerations 
Even for waves, Eq. 1 is not suitable for steady-state excitations [4] and the second term 
violates causality. However there is a way to modify this equation under steady-state 
conditions in the case of KLJN by using direction-dependent phase velocities [2] of retarded 
potentials. Furthermore causality is ascertained by setting  
U(t, x) =U+ t − xv+
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟ +U− t −
D − x
v−
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟   ,       (4) 
where x = 0 and x = D pertain to the left-hand and right-hand ends of the cable, respectively, 
and D is cable length. The phase velocities are  
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v+ =
DRB
Lc
   and    v− =
DRA
Lc
  ,        (5) 
where RA  and RB  are Alice’s and Bob’s resistances, Lc  is the inductance of the cable and it 
is assumed that Alice is at x = 0 and Bob is at x = D. 
It is important to realize that, according to Eqs. 4 and 5, Eve must know Alice’s and Bob’s 
resistor values in order to have the correct input for the GAA experiments. This implies that 
Eve’s one-bit uncertainty persists, which is the indication of security. A proof of security will 
be given below in Eq. 21.  
Our earlier work [2] proved that, in the quasi-static frequency limit pertinent to the KLJN 
scheme, the exact distributed-impedance rendition of the cable shown in Fig. 1 leads to the 
simplified serial impedance models in Figs. 2a and 2b because the capacitive currents 
converge towards zero in the limit of low frequencies. Figure 2a is a first-order approximation 
of the real situation while Fig. 2b models a situation wherein the cable is lossless or the 
voltage drop on the resistive component is negligible compared to that of the inductive 
component in the dominant frequency range of the quasi-static regime.  
 
 
Figure 1. Outline of the pertinent part of the KLJN scheme with a distributed LCR model of a long and leakage-
free cable [2]. When the cable losses can be neglected, one may omit the Ri resistors representing the distributed 
resistance of the cable. Alice’s and Bob’s resistors—denoted RA and RB, respectively—are randomly selected 
from the set RL ,RH{ }with (RL ≠ RH )  at the beginning of each bit-exchange period. These resistors, with 
associated serial generators (not shown), emulate thermal noise with high noise temperature and strongly limited 
bandwidth. 
 
 
Figure 2. Lumped impedance-components-based model of a short cable at low frequencies for analyzing voltage 
drop along the cable and phase shift in the quasi static limit [2]. Part (a) represents a cable with loss (cable 
inductance and resistance are designated Lc and Rc, respectively), and part (b) represents a lossless cable. Part (c) 
is used to determine the voltage drop in the asymptotic case where loss dominates the cable impedance (this case 
is not practical and is used only for the sake of analysis). 
 
Figure 3 provides a starting point for our security analysis of the KLJN scheme. UA and UB 
are voltages of the (thermal) noise voltage generators, and RA and RB are Alice’s and Bob’s 
resistors, respectively. Here U1 and U2 are voltages at the two ends of the cable, and Zc 
denotes cable impedance. Furthermore we set U12 = U1 – U2. 
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Figure 3. Circuit for impedance-based analysis of GAA’s attack, as described in the main text. 
 
In order to accomplish security, the voltage drop on the cable must be kept small in 
comparison with other voltages [3], i.e.,  
U1 ≅U2 ≡U  .           (6) 
We first consider the earlier mentioned wire-resistance-based attack [3,5], wherein miniscule 
differences between the mean-square voltages U12  and U22  served as information leak 
toward Eve. In the experimental demonstration, [5], chossing the number of observed 
correlation times Noc during bit-exchange to 50, the wire resistance to 200 Ω, RA = 2 kΩ and 
RB = 9kΩ, resulted in Eve’s successful guessing probability p=0.525, which means that the 
relative information leak was 0.19% of the exchanged key bits. This implies that two-stage 
privacy amplification would be needed [6] to reduce this leak to a level below the desired one 
of 10–8. For this type of attack, p scales as [7] 
p = 0.5 +θ Zc
2
RARB
            (7) 
at fixed Noc, where θ  is a constant which depends only on Noc.  
Turning now to GAA’s experiments [1], Zc
2  is about 105 times smaller than before while 
their RA and RB have similar values (1 kΩ and 10 kΩ, respectively). With the same Noc as 
above and using the old method [3] together with GAA’s parameters, Eve’s probability of 
successful bit guessing would be [6] 
p ≈ 0.5000002  ,          (8) 
which is better than even the value of p needed to secure the upper limit of 10–8 for the 
relative information leak (p = 0.5006 [6]). 
In stark contradiction to the results above, GAA assert that by using their standard statistical 
method they measure 
p ≈1             (9) 
at the given conditions. This is an extraordinarily strong claim which—if correct—would 
mean that Eve can perform a nearly-deterministic guess not only about the bit-states but also 
of the exact time dependence of Alice’s and Bob’s noise voltages. 
 
2.2 Case 1: Lossless short cable with very small impedance 
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In the case of a lossless cable with very small impedance, we assume that Rel. 6 holds but that 
U12 remains measurable. Suppose now that Eve employs Eq. 2 to extract information. Using 
the proper velocity and the measurable quantities at the left-hand side of Eq. 2a, we get 
dU
dt + v+
dU
dx = 2
dUx
dt  .                 (10) 
The resulting voltage Ux(t) in the right-hand side of Eq. 2a needs clarification at this point. To 
this end we Fourier transform Eq. 6 and obtain 
jωU(ω )+ v+ dU(ω )dx = 2 jωUx (ω )  ,                          (11) 
so that 
2Ux (ω ) =U(ω )+ v+jω
dU(ω )
dx                            (12) 
or 
2Ux (ω ) =U(ω )+ DRBjωLc
dU(ω )
dx =U(ω )+
DRB
jωLc
U12 (ω )
D    ,                                 (13) 
where  U12(ω ) =U1(ω )−U2(ω )  . Using Ohm’s law for impedance, we have 
2Ux (ω ) =U(ω )+ RB U1,2 (ω )jωLc =U(ω )+ RBI(ω )   .                       (14) 
A relation  
U(ω ) ≅U1(ω ) ≅U2 (ω )  ,               (15) 
which is the Fourier transform of Eq. 6, holds when the cable impedance is very small (cf. 
Fig. 3) so that 
2Ux (ω ) =U2 (ω )+ RBI(ω ) =UB(ω )   .            (16) 
After inverse Fourier transformation and substituting the voltages back into Eq. 6, it is found 
that the corrected Eq. 2a reads as 
dU
dt + v+
dU
dx =
dUB(t)
dt   .               (17) 
Similar considerations for GAA’s other equation, with the opposite sign of the second term, 
lead to 
dU
dt − v−
dU
dx =
dUA(t)
dt    .              (18) 
The right-hand sides of Eqs. 17 and 18 give the time derivative of the voltages of Alice’s and 
Bob’s generators provided Eve uses the correct guess and consequently substitutes the correct 
resistances in these equations. This result proves that GAA do not have a directional coupler 
but something else, which can be called a “separator” and is able to extract the voltage 
amplitudes of Alice’s and Bob’s generators (without the voltage-division caused by the 
resistor at the other end). Such a tool would be even better for Eve, but it works only if the 
correct phase velocity is assumed. The phase velocity in the steady state is determined by the 
unknown resistor terminating the cable toward the propagation direction [2], and therefore 
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Eve must correctly guess the value of the resistor at that end in order to obtain the correct 
voltage. 
 
The most important question is this: what happens if Eve assumes the wrong resistor value at 
Bob’s side, i.e., if Eve assumes Alice’s resistor value? Obviously, the resulting voltage Ux(t) 
will then be a weighted superposition of the voltages seen by Alice and Bob. However, the 
real question concerns the statistical properties associated with Eve’s choice. Can Eve utilize 
these properties to extract information?  
The answer to the questions is simple, and we first observe that the voltage Ux(t) will be a 
Gaussian noise [8–10], because a linear combination of Gaussians results in a Gaussian as a 
consequence of the Central Limit Theorem [11]. Thus the real question regards the variance 
of the voltage. Its calculation is straightforward, and Eq. 16 becomes 
2Ux (ω ) =U2 (ω )+ RAI(ω ) ≅U1(ω )+ RAI(ω )   .           (19) 
Here it is important to realize that the cable voltage and cable current are orthogonal—i.e., 
uncorrelated—in order to ensure zero net power flow and satisfy the Second Law of 
Thermodynamics [7,12–15], so that 
 U (t)I(t) = 0  .               (20) 
Thus Pythagoras’ Rule gives that the variance (mean-square) of the sum at the right-hand side 
of Eq. 19 is invariant to changing the plus sign to a minus sign, which is given a pictorial 
rendition in Fig. 4. It follows that 
Ux2 (t) = U12 (t) + RA2 I 2 (t) = U12 (t) − RA2 I 2 (t)   ,          (21) 
which is exactly the variance of Alice’s noise voltage in accordance with Kirchhoff’s law (cf. 
Fig. 3). It should be remarked that GAA used time derivatives, but this does not change the 
situation of orthogonality.  
 
Figure 4. Illustration showing that added orthogonal noise voltages produce the same RMS voltage and mean-
square voltage even if the sign of the current is flipped to the opposite value. The resulting time-dependent 
voltages will be different although their RMS and mean-square and RMS amplitudes remain the same. 
 
The mean square voltage always corresponds to that of the noise source of the assumed 
resistor, which means that Eve gets what she assumes instead of learning about the true bit-
situation provided Rel. 6 holds. Thus the only role of the inductance of the lossless cable is to 
detect the current in the wire, so that Eve’s one-bit inaccuracy remains which proves the 
security of the key exchange against this attack. It should also be noted that “separators” of 
the above mentioned kind can easily be realized by directly measuring the current and using 
Ohm’s law with guessed resistance values to determine the voltages at Alice’s and Bob’s 
ends. A further discussion of the latter issue was given elsewhere [7], where the separators 
were described and referred to as “impedance-based directional couplers”, and where it was 
pointed out that they are useless for Eve. Thus the obtained mean-square voltages satisfy the 
supposed resistance value, and Eve cannot extract any information by using this system 
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provided Rel. 6 holds. Section 2.4 below elucidates the role of the approximation leading to 
Rel. 6. 
 
2.3 Case 2: Short cable dominated by loss 
 
For a lossy cable, the voltage drop over the resistor makes even the modified d’Alembert-
equation-approach in Eq. 4 invalid, even if the correct phase velocity is used. Equations 12 
and 13 become 
2Ux (ω ) =U(ω )+ v+jω
U12 (ω )
D =U(ω )+
DRB
jωLc
U12 (ω )
D =U(ω )+
RB
Lc
U12 (ω )
jω   ,          (22) 
and inverse Fourier transformation yields 
2Ux (t) =U(t)+
RB
Lc
U12∫ (t)dt  .                (23) 
The obtained Ux does not have any meaning or information for Eve, because U(t) and the 
integral of U12(t)—which is proportional to the time integral of the current—are orthogonal 
even if the current and U(t) have some small correlation due to loss. 
 
2.4 Conclusion of sections 2.2 and 2.3 
As shown above Eve cannot extract any information, neither in the lossless nor in the lossy 
cable, provided Rel. 6 holds. However, this relation is only approximate, because there is a 
non-zero difference U12 between U1 and U2. This small difference causes a small offset 
between the related results which indeed is information for Eve. But this offset is the very 
same as that utilized directly in the old mean-square-comparison based wire-resistance-attack 
method [3] without the extra noise components shown above. The extra noise components 
weaken Eve’s information, and therefore the conclusion is straightforward: GAA’s method 
always provides less information than the old wire-resistance-attack [3]. 
 
3. Experiments: What could go wrong? 
Many things could go wrong in GAA’s experiments claimed to prove the validity of their 
attack against the KLJN scheme. Here we try to identify the most probable deficiencies but 
presume that conceptual errors concerning the experiments are not present. From the many 
possibilities, we select only a few and only those directly related to the realization of the 
KLJN scheme but not to the measurement set-up as such. 
 
3.1 The experimental claim 
GAA [1] used a standard statistical method to compare distributions of extracted voltage 
components and to identify the bit (resistor) arrangement at the two ends of the wire in the 
KLJN scheme. They asserted that they were able to identify the resistor arrangement within a 
very short time in the case of lossy cables. 
Let us now estimate the observable relative difference of the mean-square voltages at the two 
cable ends in GAA’s experiment: The resistors were 1 kΩ and 10 kΩ, and the cable length 
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was 1.5 m and 2 m. GAA did not specify their cable parameters, but a 1.5-meter-long cable 
taken to be, as a reasonable assumption, a copper wire with a cross section of 1 mm2 yields a 
cable resistance of 0.07 Ω.  
As seen above, the old wire-resistance-attack [3] gives an upper limit for the extracted 
information. A mean-square operation is an efficient estimator for Gaussian processes [8], and 
therefore other statistical methods cannot offer much advantage. Using the result in an earlier 
paper [3] for the measurable relative mean-square voltage difference, we obtain 
 
Δrel2 ≈
U1
2(t) − U22(t)
U1
2(t)
≈ U1
2(t) − U22(t)
U2
2(t)
≈ Rc
2
RARB
= 0.07
103104
= 7x10−9   ,                (24) 
showing that the imbalance of the mean-square voltages of the two Gaussian noises is less 
than 10–8. GAA’s claim to identify which one of these distributions is the narrower by 
sampling a few correlation times is untenable, and normally hundreds of millions of 
correlation times would be required for a reasonably low error probability.  
The question then arises as to what GAA did measure and how they obtained their surprising 
results?  
 
3.2 Non-Gaussianity 
According to the security proofs in earlier work [9,10], it is a strict mathematical requirement 
for the security of the KLJN scheme to have Gaussian processes, which means that the time 
derivatives also must be Gaussians. GAA did not specify their waveform generator, and thus 
the degree of Gaussianity remains unclear.  
It is important to notice that most commercial noise generators use algorithms and filtering to 
approach Gaussians. Due to the Central Limit Theorem [11], time-integration shifts the 
statistics of noises toward Gaussians whereas time derivatives, which were used by GAA, 
strongly amplify non-Gaussian components. 
Thus one strong candidate for causing the poor performance of the KLJN system in GAA’s 
study [1] is non-Gaussianity of time derivatives. 
 
3.3 Aliasing effects, non-linearity, and spurious noise components 
Aliasing effects (which cause high-frequency non-Gaussian noises), non-linearity and other 
types of spurious signals in the generator are other strong candidates for destroying 
Gaussianity. Again, a time derivative will severely emphasize these weaknesses. 
 
3.4 Deterministic currents in the loop 
A low-frequency or DC current component may exist in the cable of the KLJN scheme and 
may be caused by a ground loop (leading to a 50/60Hz sinusoidal current) or DC offset. The 
voltage drop originating from such parasitic currents will introduce a location-dependent bias 
into the key distributions and quickly uncover the nature of the resistors at the two ends of the 
wire, as illustrated in Fig. 5. 
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Figure 5. Schematic circuit for illustrating parasitic DC and low-frequency artifacts caused by ground loops. For 
the sake of simplicity, the parasitic source is assumed to exist solely at Alice’s side. Only the parasitic voltage 
generator is shown, because its impact is additive to the voltages caused by other circuit deficiencies. The 
parasitic DC or low-frequency components U1DC and U2DC of U1 and U2, respectively, are sensitive to the 
location of the low/high resistor at Alice’s and Bob’s side.  
 
However, Eve does not need to use GAA’s method [1] to elucidate the resistor values: She 
can simply measure and compare the DC or 50/60 Hz voltage components of the strongly 
correlated voltage noises at the two ends of the wire and extract the key or its inverse. Figure 
6 shows, as an example, computer simulations of two strongly correlated noises with a small 
DC shift. In this particular case, a single-time measurement is able to identify the DC voltage 
shift and uncover the key or its inverse. If the DC shift is greater than the stochastic difference 
between the time functions, then a single-time measurement is sufficient to distinguish the 
two noises and the bit-situations in the KLJN scheme. Concerning a 50/60 Hz parasitic signal 
in the loop, the period duration is about a hundred times greater than the correlation time of 
the noise with 5 kHz bandwidth used by GAA and thus, during the few correlation times used 
by GAA, this disturbance behaves practically as a parasitic DC shift. 
  
 
 
Figure 6. Computer-generated illustration of how a DC shift can distinguish between two strongly correlated 
noises by comparison at a single moment of time. The arrows indicate the directions of shift. 
 
For the situation illustrated above, GAA’s result, that Eve’s successful guessing probability is 
progressively enhanced by increasing cable loss, is obvious. A lossless cable is represented by 
an inductance (cf. Fig. 2b) which produces a voltage drop proportional to the time derivative 
of the current. This means zero DC voltage and zero shift between the distribution functions 
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due to a parasitic DC current in the loop. However the situation is changed when cable loss is 
present, and then a DC voltage shift will occur in accordance with Ohm’s law as a result of 
the cable resistance Rc. This effect will be strongly enhanced by the time derivation of the 
channel voltage in GAA’s scheme because the voltage drop in the cable is not time-derivated. 
 
4. Conclusion  
We have shown that GAA’s approach [1] is invalid and that their experimental results must 
be caused by artifacts. Nevertheless, a correct interpretation of GAA’s results is very 
enlightening because it shows clearly that nonlinearities, non-Gaussianity (even a weak one), 
aliasing effects and parasitic currents constitute very dangerous potential non-idealities in a 
practical KLJN system. The removal of such effects is straightforward, however, and can be 
accomplished by careful circuit design, filters, etc., while ignoring these effects can lead to 
cracking of the key. Furthermore, a well-defended KLJN system can execute spectral and 
statistical analysis on the noise in the cable and, together with a proper computer model of the 
cable, ascertain that effects due to parasitic currents are not present and thereby assure safe 
results. These types of checks are possible because the KLJN system is a classical physical 
one, and classical physics permits continuous monitoring of signals and parameters of the 
channel without destroying this information, which is a situation very unlike that in a 
quantum system. Thus the robustness of the KLJN state is offered by classical physics and is 
essential for the security of the key exchange within the KLJN scheme. 
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